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Abstract
Even if a patientʼs access to health information has been enhanced, a patient still doesnʼt
have enough ability to utilize it. Therefore, a doctorʼse ﬀort to sincerely communicate with a
patient might aﬀect the patientʼs use of medical care. This paper builds up the empirical model
and found the eﬀect of a doctorʼse ﬀort on patientʼs medical care use was signiﬁcant and
according to the ex-ante health status of a patient, a doctorʼse ﬀort inﬂuenced a patientʼs
medical care use in diﬀerent way.
Key words: asymmetry of information between doctor and patient; patientʼs medical care use;
doctorʼse ﬀort to eﬀectively communicate with patients; patientʼs ex-ante health
status
JEL Classiﬁcation: I10, I11
I. Introduction
As a result of rapidly developing information technologies such as the Internet, patients are
better provided with health information about their health status, as well as about the
eﬀectiveness of medical treatments. For example, a woman who is pregnant with her ﬁrst child
is likely to need information about the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy, such as morning sickness,
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＊ Corresponding Author.home remedies, and when to call her physician. An email containing such information could
show up on her desktop computer just before she gets morning sickness. During the third
trimester, she is likely toexperience swelling in her legs and pain in her lo wer back; thus, an
email that provides this kind of information allows her to have a more comfortable experience
with pregnancy. In addition, she is less concerned, makes fewer calls to her physician, and
knows when she should call her doctor. Therefore, patientsʼ eﬃcient use of medical care
through informed decision-making might have a role in suppressing rapidly increasing health
care expenditures, which is the signiﬁcant role of consumer health information (Brunt, 1998).
However, in order to support this view, in terms of the role of consumer health
information, we need to consider that a consumerʼs ability tosearch, co llect, interpret, and
evaluate the quality of health information would play a more important role in his
1 decision-
making process; more than just the amount of information. Even if enhanced access to health
information might aﬀe c tap a t i e n t ʼs decision-making, it is uncertain how much information
would induce a patient to eﬃciently use medical care (Culter, et al., 2004), which suggests that
if a patient still has a problem with understanding and evaluating health information, his
decision-making process might be more complicated. In other words, what a patient needs for
informed decision making in using medical care is not just health information per se, but the
ability to understand, interpret, and analyze the health information or medical knowledge (Lim,
2007).
For example, letʼs assume there is a patient who has a severe myopic vision problem that
can easily be cured by wearing glasses. He is currently considering taking LASIK (Laser-
Assisted In Situ Keratomileusis) surgery, which is a procedure that permanently changes the
shape of the cornea (the clear covering over the front of the eye) using an excimer laser. This
treatment is popular and has been regarded as one of the most eﬀective surgical processes for
reducing a personʼs dependency on glasses and contact lenses. However, according to the
College of American Ophthalmology, the degree at which the patient recovers his sight would
depend on his idiosyncratic properties, such as the shape and thickness of his cornea. Thus, it
has been suggested that the averge probability of perfectly recovering a patientʼs sight as 20/20
is 67%. Hence, before surgery, his doctor should provide him this medical information and
discuss his speciﬁc physical characteristics.
However, letʼs assume the communication between them on the eﬀectiveness and limitation
of this surgery is not enough for the patient to correctly understand. Based on this situation it is
highly plausible that the patient would misevaluate the eﬀectiveness of the LASIK surgery
because his perception of its eﬀectiveness is based solely on his subjective evaluation of the
medical information. Unfortunately, if the result of surgery is below the patientʼs expectation
for his eyesight, he might retake the surgery, which could be regarded as ineﬃcient use of
medical care.
Therefore, in this context, a doctorʼs provision of eﬀort to closely communicate with a
patient might aﬀect the patientʼs use of medical care, by aﬀecting the process in which the
patient forms his or her perception of the eﬀectiveness of medical care, based on the medical
information provided by the doctor.
However, even if we might think the doctorʼse ﬀort could aﬀect the patientʼsu s eof
medical care, the direction of the eﬀect might be questionable. If one can set up the medically
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1 In this paper, we denote a patient as male and a doctor as a female for convenience.appropriate amount of medical care, which can be deﬁned as the amount that maximizes a
patientʼs health status after medical care use, the doctorʼse ﬀort would induce the amount of
medical care use that is medically appropriate for the patient. For example, if a patient seems to
overuse medical care, representing the quantity is greater than what is medically appropriate, a
doctor would try to decrease the amount of care by providing the appropriate eﬀorts mentioned
above.
However, it is diﬃcult tode ﬁne the medically appropriate amount of care that can be
generally accepted for all cases of patients, because each patient has his own idiosyncratic
characteristics originating not only from his speciﬁc disease, but also from his medical history,
and the eﬀectiveness of medical care would be diﬀerent from patient to patient.
Therefore, in this paper, we thought that the direction of the doctorʼse ﬀort on a patientʼs
use of medical care would be dependent upon the patientʼs ex-ante health, such as his pre-visit
health status. When the patient is assumed tounderutilize medical care, the marginal
enhancement of his health status from consuming more medical care would be positive, which
represents that the patientʼs ex-post health status improves with further consumption of medical
care. For example, elderly people could be assumed to have fairly poor ex-ante health status
because a considerable proportion of them have several chronic diseases, such as diabetes and
hypertension. Therefore, continuous use of medical care is required to enhance their health
status, and in this context, the interpersonal continuity between an elderly patient and the doctor
would play an important role in inducing the patient to purchase more medical care (Lim,
2007).
Therefore, if a doctor tries to eﬀectively communicate with an elderly patient whose health
status is quite poor, it could be one of the primary means for making interpersonal continuity
between the doctor and patient improved and longer. Furthermore, this improved interpersonal
continuity would cause the elderly patient to better comply with the doctorʼs recommendations
for medical treatment. Therefore, the doctorʼse ﬀort would induce the patient to increase use of
medical care.
On the opposite side, if a patientʼs ex-ante health status is fairly good, and a doctorʼse ﬀort
would work for increasing the patientʼs use of medical care, it could have a detrimental eﬀect
on the patientʼs trust in the doctor since consuming too much medical care by a patient with
fairly good ex-ante health status would be, on the contrary, harmful to his ex-post health status.
In other words, considering that the law of diminishing marginal returns could be applied to the
health production function and that a patientʼs ex-ante health status is fairly good, the room of
this patientʼs health status being enhanced after medical care use is comparatively smaller than
the patientʼs health ex-ante heath status being poor. Hence, it is highly probable that a patientʼs
use of medical care is located in a range beyond the medically appropriate amount, which
represents the patientʼs marginal enhancement of health status from consuming more medical
care might be negative, Based on this reasoning, our study empirically shows that a doctorʼs
eﬀort to closely communicate with a patient may aﬀect the patientʼs use of medical care, by
using a Community Tracking Study (CTS) dataset. And as mentioned earlier, this paper, based
on the patientʼs ex-ante health status, investigates the direction of the eﬀect of a doctorʼse ﬀort
on his patientʼs use of medical care.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II introduces the theoretical reasoning
on the direction of a doctorʼse ﬀort on a patientʼs medical care use, and Section III develops the
empirical model for investigating the eﬀect of the doctorʼse ﬀort on the patientʼs use of medical
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II. Theoretical Reasoning
Concerning the eﬀect of a doctorʼse ﬀort to eﬀectively communicate with a patient on his
use of medical care, the direction of the eﬀect can be analyzed by the following theoretical
reasoning.
The simple health production function expressed by equation (1) shows the relationship
between the health outcome and medical care.
H (M：s, T)=TM,sM
2+s (1)
In equation (1), T is the eﬀectiveness of medical treatment (M), and s is the patientʼs ex-
ante health status. This speciﬁc function is the one Lee (1995) employed in his model. It has
the following several signiﬁcant properties. The ﬁrst property is that treatment beyond a certain
level could be harmful. This property is captured by the quadratic health production function,
and mathematically can be expressed as follows:
 H
 M=T,2sMC0, where MB
T
2s (2)
In that expression, the level of T/2s is the one maximizing a patientʼs ex-post health status,
which is deﬁned as the medically appropriate amount, and treatment beyond this level,
representing overuse of medical care, could be harmful for the patientʼs ex-post health status.
Another property of this function is that the marginal beneﬁt of medical care lowers as the
individual consumes more medical care, because “the law of diminishing marginal returns”





Finally, the patientʼs ex-ante health status aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of medical treatment,
since a small enhancement from treatment would be enough when the individual is fairly
healthy. This can be expressed as follows:
 
2H
 M s=,2MC0 (4)
Hence, if a patient is already fairly healthy in the pre-visit stage, the marginal
enhancement of the patientʼs health status by using medical care would be smaller than that of
other patients whose health status is quite bad.
The reasoning above, however, assumes that asymmetric information between doctor and
patient doesnʼt exist, which suggests that a patient has enough ability of evaluating not only his
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above, a doctor is supposed to act as perfect agent of patient, which indicates a doctor truly
tries to inform a patient on s and T. However, considering the asymmetric information problem
between patient and doctor, such as knowledge imbalance on s and T, it is plausible for a
doctor to induce demand for unnecessary medical services from patient. Speciﬁcally, in
equation (2), if a doctor provides downwardly biased information on s or upwardly biased
information on T, a patient might think that the range of M showing positive marginal
enhancement of health status becomes more wider, which induces a patient to demand more
medical services than medically appropriate amount.
However, if a patient experiences exacerbated ex-post health status due to over-
consumption of medical services, it would be harmful to a doctorʼs reputation, which causes a
doctorʼs ability of inducing medical services to be limited. Speciﬁcally, if a patientʼs ex-ante
health status is fairly good, leading this patientʼs marginal enhancement of health from medical
care use tobe smaller than ano ther patient ʼs whose ex-ante health status is quite bad, but if a
patient over evaluates on T, it is very plausible that this patient might use more medical care
than the medically appropriate amount. In this sense, we can infer that a doctor facing this
comparatively healthy patient tends to recommend less medical care than what a patient
expects, because a patientʼs aggravated ex-post health status due to the overutilization of
medical care would discredit the patientʼs trust in the doctor, and this could be a detrimental
means for a doctorʼs reputation causing a doctorʼs future practice revenue tobe reduced. In this
context, it is suggested that a doctor should have an incentive to closely communicate with the
patient in order to correct this overvaluation of eﬀectiveness, by which a doctor can easily
induce a patientʼs compliance with her intent in decreasing the amount of medical care utilized
by the patient.
Based on the same logic, if a patientʼs ex-ante health status is fairly poor, representing this
patientʼs marginal enhancement of health status is comparatively larger than other patients,
however, if a patient under evaluates on T, it is highly probable that this patient might use less
medical care than the medically appropriate amount. So a doctor would recognize the patientʼs
ex-post health status can be enhanced by utilizing more medical services and also think a
patientʼs better health status might be fruitful toher reputatio n. In this sense, it is natural to
infer that a doctor facing this comparatively unhealthy patient tends to recommend more
medical care than what a patient expects. In this context, as the former case, it is also suggested
that a doctor should have an incentive to closely communicate with the patient in order to
correct this undervaluation on eﬀectiveness in order to achieve her intent in increasing patientʼs
use of medical care.
Therefore, based on the properties mentioned above, it is reasonable to think that the
direction of the eﬀect of a doctorʼse ﬀort to eﬀectively communicate with a patient on his use
of medical care would be determined by the patientʼs ex-ante health status.
III. The Empirical Model
An individualʼs decision-making process of purchasing medical care could be regarded as a
sequential process. Whenever he feels sick, he indeed has to make a medical decision of
whether to consult a doctor. Once he decides to consult a doctor and visits, given information
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alleviating his health problem provided by doctor, he decides to comply with his doctorʼs
opinion with purchasing medical care. Based on this sequential decision process, individualʼs
medical care utilization is expressed by using two part model which consists of the equation
representing individualʼs decision-making of visiting doctor, and of the equation expressing the
patientʼs total use of medical care, conditional on any use.
Regarding the information about an individualʼs ex-ante health status, in the CTS dataset,
the variable is constructed by combining the individualʼs proxy-reported and self-reported
values of general health status. The variable has a 5-scale value from 1 (poor), 2 (fair), 3
(good), 4 (very good), and 5 (excellent)
2. Hence, in this paper, the following empirical model is
separately applied to each group according to the value of this variable that represents
individual ex-ante health status.
1. The Empirical Model for an Individualʼs Medical Care Use
As we mentioned above, an individualʼs medical care use is formulated by using a two-
part model. The equation (5) describes an individual iʼs probability of visiting doctor.
m
*










1i is the latent variable that represents the patientʼs doctor-visit; di is the indicator of the
existence of any doctor visit for purchasing medical care; Zi is the vector representing an
individual iʼs socio-demographic factors, such as age, sex, education, and income level as well
as health status; Ii is the dummy variable representing whether an individual i has health
insurance, the biʼs are the parameters; and e1i is the random term assumed to have normal
distribution by e1i〜N(0, 1).
Regarding the variable Ii, as many health economists insist (Cameron, et al., 1988; Norton,
2002), an individualʼs expected medical care utilization and expenditure for a given period
could aﬀect his decision on choice of health insurance, and various characteristics of the health
insurance could aﬀect his utilization of medical care, which suggest there is mutual
interdependency between the decision of medical care use and health insurance purchase.
Hence, an individualʼs health insurance choice is speciﬁed by equation (6) below:




where Ri is the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) penetration rate of each geographical
area where an individual i resides, the wiʼs are parameters, and the error term vi is assumed to
follow a normal distribution. The HMO penetration rate of each area might play a role in
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2 The portion of each group out of the total sample was group 1 (poor, 3.79%), group 2 (fair, 10.21%), group 3
(good, 23.65%), group 4 (very good, 36.41%), and group 5 (excellent, 25.95%).identifying equation (6). A similar identifying strategy can be found in the paper by Norton, et.
al. (2002).
As the method for solving endogeneity problem of individualʼs insurance choice, the
bivariate probit method is used for jointly estimating equation (5) and (6). Considering that
unobserved individual heterogeneity might cause the two error terms to be correlated each
other, which might be a source of endogeneity bias, it is very beneﬁcial to perform joint
estimation. This comes directly from the consideration of greater asymptotic eﬃciency in the
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) context, in the case where the coeﬃcient of correlation
(r) between the error terms in these two equations is not equal to zero because of the statistical
and structural endogeneity.
Conditional on a positive number of doctor visits, an individual iʼs total medical care use
represented by a patientʼs total out-of-pocket medical care cost, is as follows:
log(m2i|di=1)=d´ 1Zi+d2ei+e2i (7)
where m2i is an individual iʼs total out-of-pocket medical cost during some time; ei is the
individual iʼs observation on his doctorʼse ﬀort level of eﬀective communication; the diʼs are the




Because CTS dataset used in this paper does not include the information on individual
total medical cost, an individual iʼs total out-of-pocket medical cost is used for representing
total amount of medical care use. Total out-of-pocket medical cost, however, might be aﬀected
by the characteristics of health insurance, such as the size of deductible or coinsurance rate, so
regarding the possibility of total out-of-pocket medical costʼs representing true utilization of
medical care, we investigated the correlation between total out-of-pocket medical cost and total
number of doctor-visit or total number of hospitalization. The correlation coeﬃcients were very
high, such as 0.72 and 0.68 respectively, which might show the rationale of using it as a proxy
of total medical care use.
The variable Ii is excluded in equation (7), but included in equation (5) for identifying the
equation system. When it comes to an individualʼs use of medical care due to a health problem,
it is reasonable to think the individualʼs health insurance would directly aﬀect his decision of
doctor-visit, even if one might think of the possibility of its indirect eﬀects on the patientʼst ot a l
medical care use. Furthermore, we think that once a patient visits doctor, the eﬀect of supply
side, doctor, on patientʼs total medical care use might be more signiﬁcant than demand side
eﬀect.
Regarding the doctorʼse ﬀort level, we used the patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼse ﬀort
(ei) as a proxy variable for the doctorʼs true level of eﬀort. The patientʼs evaluation of the
doctorʼse ﬀort level will at least to some degree be based on his observation of how well the
doctor explains the eﬀectiveness of medical treatment, such as whether the doctor uses plain
language, and how eagerly the doctor tries to understand and answer questions. While it may be
true that only the doctor knows her true level of eﬀort, a reasonable indication of that eﬀort
might be a patientʼs evaluation of it, because except for the doctor, usually only the patient
actually observes the doctorʼs level of eﬀort, even if in some cases the patient goes in the
company of one or more family members, friends, or paid care-givers.
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the doctorʼse ﬀort level during his most recent visit to the doctor. In this data, there are two
questions about the patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼse ﬀort level to eﬀectively communicate
with him. The ﬁrst question concerns the doctorʼs attitude on listening to the patientʼs health
problems and questions concerning medical treatment. In the survey, a patient was asked, “how
would you rate how well your doctor listened to you?” The patientʼs answer tothat questio n is
categorized by 5 scale measures ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). The second question
concerns the doctorʼs attempts toexplain bo th the patient ʼs health problems and the possible
eﬀectiveness of medical treatment, in order to aid the patient in understanding the medical
situation and treatment options. The patient was asked, “how would you rate how well the
doctor explained things in a way you could understand?” The patientʼsa n s w e ri sa g a i n
categorized by 5 scale measures ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). Therefore, in this paper,
by summing these two answers, an index of the doctorʼse ﬀort level was produced, and based
on the value of this index, we assume that as the patientʼs evaluation index value rises, the
doctor in fact exerts more eﬀort.
The validity of using these questions to measure the doctorʼs level of eﬀort to closely
communicate with the patient can be investigated by tracking the resemblance of these
questions with the “Modiﬁed Picker Survey” questionnaire. The Modiﬁed Picker Survey is used
tosurvey a patient ʼs evaluation of the relationship with his doctor (Edgman ＆ Cleary, 1996).
This survey asks patients about the various aspects of doctor-patient interaction, in order to
measure the patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼs practice style. Among the question items in the
Modiﬁed Picker Survey, questions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 can be regarded as items that also measure
the patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼse ﬀort to eﬀectively communicate with him. We can see
these items are similar to the two questions in the CTS Household survey used in this paper.
Table 1 includes the speciﬁc questions of the Modiﬁed Picker Survey.
2. Econometric Issue: Endogeneity of DoctorʼsE ﬀort
Since the doctorʼse ﬀort is measured by the patientʼs evaluation of it, we should consider
the endogeneity of this variable. In this study, as the solution to this econometric issue, the
2SLS method was applied, and its predicted value was obtained by estimating the following
equation (8).
ei=g´ 1Zi+g´ 2 Xi+e3i (8)
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4. Does your physician ask you about how your family or living situation might aﬀect your health?
3. Does your physician take enough time to answer your questions?
7. Are you involved in decision about your care as much as you want?
6. When you see your physician, do you have questions about your care that you want to discuss but do not?
1. Does your physician give you enough time to explain the reasons for your visit?
5. Do you get as much medical information as you want from your physician?
TABLE 1. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MODIFIED PICKER SURVEY
2. When you ask questions, do you get answers that are understandable?where Xi is a vector composed of the individualʼs attitude toward the doctorʼs practice style, and
e3i is the error term described by e3i〜N(0, s
2
3).
In the CTS Household data, we obtain information on the patientʼs attitude toward the
doctorʼs practice style by asking twoquestio ns. The ﬁrst question concerns the individualʼs level
of agreement on the statement of “I trust my doctor to put my medical needs above all other
considerations when treating my medical problems.” And the second question is on the
statement of “I sometimes think my doctor might perform unnecessary tests or procedures.”
The patientʼs answers to these questions are categorized by 5 scale measures ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Considering that the doctorʼse ﬀort to eﬀectively communicate with the patient is measured
by the patientʼs evaluation of it, the patientʼs idiosyncratic characteristics of thinking, in terms
of his doctorʼs practice style, should be controlled in the estimation process, and additionally,
those variables play a role in identifying equation (8) from the other equations. After estimating
equation (8), the predicted value of ei , êi is used as regressor in the following equation (9).
log(m2i|di=1)=d´ 1Zi+d2êi+e2i (9)
In the process of performing 2SLS above, according to Murphy and Topel (1985), the
second-step estimated standard errors and related test statistics based on these procedures might
be incorrect. Hence in order to obtain robust test statistics, the method of estimating standard
errors in equation (9) suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985) was applied in this paper.
IV. The Empirical Results
1. Data
As mentioned earlier, the data set used in this study came from the Community Tracking
Survey (CTS). The CTS, sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, is a national
study designed totrack changes in the health care system as well as the e ﬀects of these changes
on care delivery and on individuals (Center for Studying Health System Change, 2000). Central
to the design of the CTS is its community focus. The survey was conducted in sixty randomly
selected communities (sites) (51 metropolitan areas and 9 nonmetropolitan areas), to be
representative of the nation as a whole. The CTS sites were selected using stratiﬁed sampling
with probabilities proportional to population size. The supplemental sample, selected with
stratiﬁed random sampling, was included in the survey to increase the precision of national
estimates (Kemper, 1996).
Among the CTS data sets, the Community Tracking Study Household Survey (1996-1997)
was used in this study. The primary purposes of the Household Survey are to track peopleʼs
insurance coverage, access to care, medical service use, satisfaction with care, and health status.
The total household sample size was 60,446 households. Individuals in the household were
grouped into family insurance units (FIU). An FIU reﬂects family groupings that are typically
used by insurance carriers. It includes an adult household member, his or her spouse (if any),
and any dependent children 0 − 17 years of age. However in this study, we used only the
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other words, the family members might aﬀect an individualʼs decision making for medical care
use, so the unobserved heterogeneity from the eﬀect among family members could threaten the
robustness of estimates.


























Whether having a health related job
(1 if he/she has, 0 if not)
Income ($ of 1995 price level)
Education (years of school)





0.486 0.499 0 1
36.656 13.054 18
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES US E DI NT H EESTIMATION MODEL
64
Mean
50.179 9.846 11.45 69.04
0.067 0.250 0 1




0.312 0.463 0 1
0.229 0.420 0 1
0.713 0.452 0 1
4.765 9.836 0 96
3.954 1.083 1 5
7.953 2.012 2 10
0.240 0.427 0 1
0.217 0.412 0 1
286.48 688.75 0 9,000
0.733 0.442 0 1
0.276 0.129 0.01 0.53
3.997 1.055 1 5
Average number of cigarettes per day
Physical health status
4.324 1.191 1 5
4.423 1.021 1 5
5.113 1.344 2.302 9.104
Whether living in West area (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Whether living in Midwest area (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Whether living in South area (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Whether living in Northeast area (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Whether to have health insurance or not
(1 insured, 0 uninsured)
Whether to visit doctor or not (1 if visit, 0 if not)
The HMO penetration rate of the geographic area
The patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼs explanation
(5 if excellent, 4 if very good, 3 if good, 2 if fair, 1 if poor)
The patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼs listening
(5 if excellent, 4 if very good, 3 if good, 2 if fair, 1 if poor)
The summation of scores of
LSTLISN and LSTEXPL
The degree of patientʼs trust on doctorʼs practice style
(5 if strongly agree, 4 if somewhat agree, 3 if neither
agree/disagree, 2 if somewhat disagree, 1 if strongly disagree)
The degree of patientʼs trust on doctorʼs practice style
(5 if strongly agree, 4 if somewhat agree, 3 if neither
agree/disagree, 2 if somewhat disagree, 1 if strongly disagree)
The value of the natural log of MEDCOST
The total individual out-of-pocket medical costs
($ of 1995 price level)The sample size used in this study was 14,134 persons, each of whom formulated a 1-
person household. Among them, persons whose ages were below 18 or above 64 were dropped
out of this study; because it is plausible they were dependent on other persons for decision of
medical care use, and may be aﬀected by persons such as parents or siblings. Hence, the ﬁnal
total sample size was 8,153.
Table 2 shows the explanations for each independent variable and dependent variable of
the estimation equations mentioned above. Also, Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of
independent and dependent variables. Among them, the variable PCS12 represents an
individualʼs health status measured by using the SF-12 Physical Component Summary score,
which is calculated based on the Health Instituteʼs scoring algorithm. A higher score for this
variable represents better health status. In considering an individualʼs health-related behavior,
smoking habit was included as an explanatory variable. The individualsʼ geographical areas are
categorized as the Northeastern area, Southern area, Midwest area, and Western area, according
tothe criteria made by the U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
Depending on which group an individual belongs to, the general socio-economic
characteristics of each group are somewhat diﬀerent. For example, as a groupʼs health status
becomes healthy, the average age decreases and the average income and education levels rise.
Regarding medical care use, each groupʼs average use of medical care proportionally increases
as health status becomes unhealthy
3. Hence, an individualʼs subjective evaluation of health
status used in this paper could be applied as a criterion for dividing whole samples with each
group, whose objective and medical ex-ante health status is diﬀerentiated by each group.
2. The Estimation Result: Eﬀect of a DoctorʼsE ﬀort on Patientʼs Medical Care Use
(1) The case of a patientʼs health status being excellent, very good, or good
The case of a patientʼs health status being excellent
The estimation results are shown at Table 3. At pre-visit stage, concerning a patientʼs
decision on doctor-visit and on purchasing health insurance, the estimation results were derived
by applying bivariate probit method and the results are shown at the ﬁrst and second column of
Table 3. First of all, regarding the possibility of individual insurance choice being endogenized
variable, it proves to be nonexistent. The r, which represents the coeﬃcient of correlation
between the error terms in these two equations is shown to be insigniﬁcant based on Likelihood
Ratiotest o f r=0.
Concerning individual insurance choice, the estimation results are consistent with the
previous research (Cameron et al., 1988), which suggests that the older, male, the white and the
more educated have higher probability of purchasing health insurance. Furthermore, the
smokers seem to show lower probability of purchasing health insurance, which supports the
view of insurance companies doing risk-selection by performing risk screening.
When it comes to individual decision on doctor-visit, the results are pretty coincident with
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3 The average out of pocket medical cost of the group whose health status was poor was above three times that of
the group whose health status was excellent. Regarding the rate of doctor visits during some periods, the rate was
68.7% for the group whose health status was excellent; however it was 81.7% for the group whose health status was
poor.previous researches (Grossman, 1972; Cameron et. al, 1988). For example, the white seems to
show higher probability of visiting doctor and this result might be understood in the context of
the positive relation between race and income. However, the age showed negative eﬀect on the
probability of doctor-visit with statistical signiﬁcance which seems tobe co ntradict with the
previous research. It can be interpreted that people will consult doctors more frequently for
prevention purposes, which might reduce the probability and prevalence of any acute and/or
chronic diseases during the aging process. Additionally, in this paper, since an individual
medical care use is restricted to curative care services, this result might be understood.
Concerning individual decision on the total medical care use at post stage, the estimation
results shown at the third column of Table 3 indicate that the doctorʼse ﬀort to closely



















*＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level;
**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level,
a dropped due to collinearity ,
b standard error using Murphy and Topel method,
c statistical signiﬁcance is evaluated based on Likelihood Ratio test of r=0
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-0.1275
c 0.1971communicate with the patient has a negative eﬀect on the patientʼs medical care use with
statistical signiﬁcance. This result suggests a doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for decreasing
amount of medical care used by patient. Since the patientʼs health status is fairly good, we can
infer that a doctor who provides medical care to this patient group would have the intent to
reduce the amount of medical care, because the overutilization of medical care would
deteriorate the patientʼs ex-post health status causing a doctorʼs reputation to be hurt. This result
is consistent with the expectation from the theoretical reasoning discussed in the previous
section.
In this paper, the endogeneity problem of doctorʼse ﬀort level was overcome by applying
2SLS and the estimation results of regressing covariates on doctorʼse ﬀort are shown at the
fourth column of Table 3. According to Bollen et al. (1995), in order for 2SLS to be regarded
as appropriate method of correcting endogeneity problem, the R
2 in the regression equation that
generates the predicted value should be greater than 0.1. The adjusted R
2 in regression equation
of patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level was 0.1439, which was large enough to apply
2SLS method as a solution of correcting endogeneity problem.
Concerning the eﬀect of other covariate, the older, female and the more educated
comparatively seems to highly evaluate doctorʼse ﬀort level. Especially, patientʼs attitudes
toward the doctorʼs practice style are shown to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on patientʼs evaluation on
doctorʼse ﬀort level, and furthermore, when estimating regression equation of patientʼst ot a l
medical care use with these variables the eﬀects of these variables were statistically
insigniﬁcant.
4 Considering these variables are supposed to be used as identifying variables, the
estimation results above suggest these variables work well as identifying variables.
The case of a patientʼs health status being very good
The estimation results in the case where a patientʼs health status is very good are shown at
Table 4. As with the previous case, the estimation results on a patientʼs decision on doctor-visit
and on purchasing health insurance were derived by applying bivariate probit method and the
results are shown at the ﬁrst and second column of Table 4. The possibility of individual
insurance choice being endogenized variable is still proved to be nonexistent. We canʼt reject
r=0 based on Likelihood Ratio test. Concerning individual decision on insurance choice and
on doctor visit, the estimation results are consistent with the former case. An individual age
still shows negative eﬀect on the probability of doctor-visit, but the eﬀect is statistically
insigniﬁcant. Though the estimates are insigniﬁcant, it is interesting too bserve that “sex” had
positive eﬀects on the probability of doctor visit. According to the result, a male uses less
medical care services than female which suggests a male tends tounder-evaluate the bene ﬁts of
medical services than a female does. And as expected, individual education level has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of doctor-visit.
Concerning individual decision on the total medical care use at post stage, the estimation
results are shown at the third column of Table 4. First of all, the doctorʼse ﬀort to closely
communicate with the patient had still a negative eﬀect on the patientʼs medical care use with
statistical signiﬁcance. This result also suggests a doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for
decreasing the amount of medical care used by the patient and is consistent with the
expectation from the theoretical reasoning.
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4 The estimation results are available on request from the authors.Additionally, the estimation results of the regression equation that generates the predicted
value of patientʼs evaluation on the doctorʼse ﬀort level are shown at the fourth column of Table
4. The marginal eﬀects of covariates were coincident with the former case, which suggest that
the older, female and the more educated comparatively highly evaluated doctorʼse ﬀort level.
Furthermore, based on the method suggested by Bollen et al. (1995), the adjusted R
2 in
regression equation of patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level was 0.1417, which was large
enough to regard 2SLS method as appropriate method of correcting endogeneity problem.
Concerning the identiﬁcation of the equations, the identifying variables, mentioned above
were shown to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level, and when



















*＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level;
**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level,
a dropped due to collinearity ,
b standard error estimates using Murphy and Topel method,
c statistical signiﬁcance is evaluated based on Likelihood Ratio test of r=0
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PATIENTʼS MEDICAL CARE USE
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-0.1233
c 0.1595estimating regression equation of patientʼs total medical care use with these variables, the
eﬀects of these variables were still statistically insigniﬁcant, which suggests the restriction
exclusion as a method of identifying equation system works well.
The case of a patientʼs health status being good
The estimation results in the case where a patientʼs health status is good are shown at
Table 5. As with the previous two cases, the estimation results on a patientʼs decision on
doctor-visit and on purchasing health insurance were derived by applying bivariate probit
method and the results are shown at the ﬁrst and second column of Table 5. The possibility of
individual insurance choice being endogenized variable is still proved to be nonexistent based
on Likelihood Ratio test of r=0. Concerning individual decision on insurance choice and on



















*＝ statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level;
**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level,
a dropped due to collinearity,
b standard error estimates using Murphy and Topel method,
c statistical signiﬁcance is evaluated based on Likelihood Ratio test of r＝0
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0.1242
c 0.2184doctor visit, the estimation results have shown to be consistent with the former two cases.
Concerning individual decision on the total medical care use at post stage, the estimation
results are shown at the third column of Table 6. The doctorʼse ﬀort to closely communicate
with the patient had still a negative eﬀect on the patientʼs medical care use with statistical
signiﬁcance. As with the former two cases where a patientʼs ex-ante health status is fairly good,
this result also suggests a doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for decreasing the amount of
medical care used by the patient and is still consistent with the expectation from the theoretical
reasoning.
Additionally, the estimation results in the regression equation for obtaining the predicted
value of patientʼs evaluation on the doctorʼse ﬀort level are shown at the fourth column of Table
5. The adjusted R
2 in regression equation of patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level was
0.1779, which suggests 2SLS is appropriate method for solving endogeneity problem.
Regarding the identiﬁcation of the equation, the identifying variables, mentioned above were
still shown to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level, and when
estimating regression equation of patientʼs total medical care use with these variables, the
eﬀects of these variables were still statistically insigniﬁcant, which still suggests the restriction
exclusion as a method of identifying equation system works well.
Discussion on the estimation results of the above three cases
As mentioned above, the estimation results of the above three cases might conﬁrm the
expectation on the eﬀect of doctorʼse ﬀort on patientʼs total medical care use. Furthermore, in
the estimation results shown in Table 3, 4, and 5, we can ﬁnd the doctorʼse ﬀort is more
eﬀective as a patient becomes healthy. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient was -0.0989 with a
patientʼs health status being just “good,” -0.1045 with a patientʼs health status being “very
good,” and -0.1613 with a patientʼs health status being “excellent.” It is natural tothink a
doctorʼs intent toreduce a patient ʼs medical care use would increase as a patient becomes
healthy, because the possibility of experiencing negative marginal enhancement of health status
after consuming medical care services increases. Therefore, we can infer that a doctor would
make more eﬀort to closely communicate with a patient in order to correct the patientʼs
misperception of the eﬀectiveness of medical care, such as over-evaluation, which might result
in this patientʼs overutilizing medical care.
(2) The cases of a patientʼs health status being fair or poor
The case of a patientʼs health status being fair
The estimation results of a case where a patientʼs ex-ante health status is fair are shown at
Table 6. As with the former cases, the estimation results on a patientʼs decision on doctor-visit
and on purchasing health insurance were derived by applying bivariate probit method and the
results are shown at the ﬁrst and second column of Table 6. First of all, regarding the
possibility of individual insurance choice being endogenized variable, it still proves to be
nonexistent. The r, which represents the coeﬃcient of correlation between the error terms in
these two equations is shown to be insigniﬁcant based on Likelihood Ratio test of r=0.
Concerning individual decision on insurance choice and on doctor visit, the estimation results
have shown to be consistent with the three diﬀerent cases above where a patientʼs health status
is pretty good.
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results are shown at the third column of Table 6. Unlike the case where a patientʼs ex-ante
health status is fairly good, the estimation result shows that the doctorʼse ﬀort to closely
communicate with the patient on the patientʼs medical care use had a positive eﬀect on his use
of medical care, even if the statistical signiﬁcance was not guaranteed. This result suggests a
doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for increasing a patientʼs use of medical care. Since, in this
case, a patient is fairly unhealthy, we can infer that a doctor who provides medical care to this
patient group would have the intent to increase the amount of medical care because the
marginal enhancement of health from consuming medical care is likely to be positive. In other
words, considering that relatively large gains to the health status of this patient group through
medical care use can exist, this empirical indicates a doctor tries to increase the patientʼsu s eof



















*＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level;
**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level,
a dropped due to collinearity,
b standard error estimates using Murphy and Topel method,
c statistical signiﬁcance is evaluated based on Likelihood Ratio test of r＝0
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0.3913
c 0.3780medical care for obtaining better reputation from the patientʼs enhanced ex-post health status.
The estimation results in the regression equation that generates the predicted value of
patientʼs evaluation on the doctorʼse ﬀort level are shown at the fourth column of Table 6. The
marginal eﬀects of covariates were coincident with the former case, which suggest the older
and the white comparatively highly evaluated doctorʼse ﬀort level. Furthermore, the adjusted R
2
in this regression equation was 0.1695, which was large enough to regard 2SLS method as
appropriate method of correcting endogeneity problem.
Concerning the identiﬁcation of the equation, the identifying variables, such as patientʼs
attitudes toward the doctorʼs practice style, were shown to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on patientʼs
evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level, and furthermore when estimating regression equation of
patientʼs total medical care use with these variables, the eﬀects of these variables were still



















*＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level;
**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level,
a dropped due to collinearity,
b standard error estimates using Murphy and Topel method,
c statistical signiﬁcance is evaluated based on Likelihood Ratio test of r＝0
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-9statistically insigniﬁcant, which still indicates the restriction exclusion works well as a method
of identifying equation system.
The case of a patientʼs health status being poor
The estimation results of a case where a patientʼs ex-ante health status is poor are shown
at Table 7. The estimation results on a patientʼs decision on doctor-visit and on purchasing
health insurance were derived by still applying bivariate probit method and the results are
shown at the ﬁrst and second column of Table 7. The interesting point is that, unlike the former
cases, an individual insurance choice is proved to be endogenized variable. The r representing
the coeﬃcient of correlation between the error terms in these two equations is shown to be
signiﬁcant based on Likelihood Ratio test of r=0. Hence, considering unobserved individual
heterogeneity might aﬀect the estimation process, individual decision on insurance choice and
on doctor visit should be jointly estimated each other which might cause the estimation results
of applying bivariate probit method to be robust one. Concerning individual decision on
insurance choice and on doctor visit, the estimation results have shown to be consistent with
t h ec a s ew h e r eap a t i e n t ʼs health status is fair.
Concerning individual decision on the total medical care use at post stage, the estimation
results are shown at the third column of Table 7. The estimation results indicate that the
doctorʼse ﬀort to closely communicate with the patient on the patientʼs medical care use had a
positive eﬀect on his use of medical care and it was statistically signiﬁcant. As with the former
case, this result suggests that a doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for increasing a patientʼsu s eof
medical care and that the eﬀect of doctorʼse ﬀort is supported with sure in this case.
The estimation results in the regression equation of patientʼs evaluation on the doctorʼs
eﬀort level are shown at the fourth column of Table 7. The adjusted R
2 in regression equation
of patientʼs evaluation on doctorʼse ﬀort level was 0.2101, which was the large magnitude
leading 2SLS method to be regarded as an appropriate method of correcting endogeneity
problem.
The identifying variables were shown to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on patientʼs evaluation on
doctorʼse ﬀort level, and furthermore when estimating regression equation of patientʼst ot a l
medical care use with these variables, the eﬀects of these variables were still statistically
insigniﬁcant, which still suggests the restriction exclusion works well.
Discussion on the estimation results of the above two cases
In the cases where a patientʼs health status was fair or poor, the estimation result shows
that the doctorʼse ﬀort to closely communicate with the patient on the patientʼs medical care use
had a positive eﬀect on his use of medical care, even if the statistical signiﬁcances of all cases
were not guaranteed. This result suggests a doctorʼse ﬀort should be utilized for increasing a
patientʼs use of medical care and this empirical result is consistent with the expectation from
the theoretical reasoning.
Furthermore, we found the doctorʼse ﬀort to be more eﬀective as a patient becomes
unhealthy. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient was 0.0207 with a patientʼs health status being
“fair,” and 0.0397 with a patientʼs health status being “poor.” As mentioned in the previous
case of patientʼs health status being good, it is natural to think a doctorʼs intent toincrease a
patientʼs medical care use would increase as the patient becomes unhealthy, because the
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consuming medical care increases.
Therefore, we can infer that a doctor would provide more eﬀorts to closely communicate
with a patient, in order to correct the patientʼs misperception on the eﬀectiveness of medical
care, such as an under-evaluation of it which may be a reason for this patient underutilizing
medical care. Based on this context, the eﬀect of a doctorʼse ﬀort on her patientʼs medical care
use would increase as the patient becomes unhealthy.
3. The Sensitivity Check of Estimation Result: Eﬀect of a DoctorʼsE ﬀort on Patientʼs
Medical Care Use
The pattern of estimation results in Table 3 through Table 7 might be more robust to a
sensitivity check that explores several relevant issues.
The ﬁrst issue is whether the patientʼs ex-ante health status could be represented by
patientʼs self-evaluated health status. Even if sampleʼs characteristics are diﬀerent according to a
patientʼs self-evaluated health status, the estimation results of this paper could be ﬁrmly
supported with using more objective index of measuring a patientʼs health status.
Another issue is concerned with the sample size. Considering the total sample size used in
estimating models is 8,153, the sample size of a group whose health status is excellent, very
good or good is 7,011 is relatively larger than that of other groups, which is 1,142. Especially,
the sample size of a group whose health status is poor, takes only 3.79% of total sample size.
Hence this imbalance of sample might be a reason of obstructing to obtain consistent estimates.
Hence, in this paper, the sample is divided totwogro ups acco rding tothe value o f PCS
12. As mentioned above, the variable PCS12 represents an individualʼs health status measured
by using the SF-12 Physical Component Summary score, which is calculated based on the
Health Instituteʼs scoring algorithm. And a higher score for this variable represents better health
status. It has been believed that the method using the SF-12 Physical Component Summary
score can objectively represent individual health status (Kemper, 1996).
Therefore, in this paper the sample is divided by two groups depending on whether the
PCS12 is greater than 50 or not. The reason why the value of 50 is used as a critical value is
the average of PCS12 was 50.179 shown in Table 2. Even if the sample size of both groups is
still imbalanced; 5,857 vs. 2,296, the degree of it has been enhanced. The same estimation
process is applied to these two groups and the results of it are shown at Table 8.
In a group whose PCS12 is greater than 50, which suggests the health status of this group
is fairly good, the doctorʼse ﬀort has a negative eﬀect on patientʼs medical care use with
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**＝statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level;
***＝statistically signiﬁcant
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TABLE 8. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PATIENTʼS MEDICAL CARE USE (PCS)statistical signiﬁcance, which supports the main results introduced above. Furthermore, in a
group whose PCS12 is lower than 50, which suggests the health status of this group is
relatively poor, the doctorʼse ﬀort has a positive eﬀect on patientʼs medical care use with also
statistical signiﬁcance, which also supports the main results introduced above.
Therefore, with this ﬁnding, we can say that the robustness of the estimation results in this
paper can be strengthened.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigated that a doctorʼse ﬀort to closely communicate with a patient could
aﬀect the patientʼs use of medical care, and that the direction of this eﬀect could be dependent
on the patientʼs ex-ante health status.
However, the following points should be indicated as limits of this study, which will be
left for future studies to resolve. The ﬁrst is concerned with the method of measuring the
doctorʼse ﬀort level. In this paper, the patientʼs evaluation of the doctorʼse ﬀort was used as a
proxy variable to represent the doctorʼs true level of eﬀort; thus, it needs to be measured based
on more objective standards. However, if we consider that the only person who can observe a
doctorʼs true level of eﬀort is the patient, it might be less of a problem to use this as proxy
variable.
Another limit is, in considering that an individualʼs decision making process for purchasing
medical care use should be understood as a dynamic process, we need to make clear about the
eﬀect of the time factor on an individualʼs medical care use. In other words, an individualʼs
health status might have characteristics of state variable, which represents that an individualʼs
current health status should be dependent on how much medical care he used in previous
periods. Hence, the appropriate data for this study might have the characteristics of a panel or
as longitudinal one. The CTS dataset used in this study is, however, is cross-sectional. Yet, the
CTS data is supposed to be created biannually, and so it supposedly has a longitudinal form;
hence, if we can use that longitudinal form of the dataset, this limit might be lessened.
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